India’s vibrant aviation sector, projected to become the world’s third-largest by 2024, is experiencing a paradoxical surge in both passenger traffic and market consolidation, setting a challenging stage for new entrants. Despite a remarkable 22% year-on-year growth in domestic passenger traffic in 2023, surpassing pre-pandemic levels, the market remains largely dominated by two behemoths: IndiGo and the Tata-backed Air India group, collectively commanding over 90% of the market share. This duopolistic environment, recently underscored by IndiGo’s cancellation of over 4,500 flights in early December, exposing a system under strain, has prompted government officials to actively encourage fresh competition. A recent social media post by a senior official highlighted three aspiring airlines—Shankh Air, AlHind Air, and FlyExpress—that had received initial no-objection certificates (NOCs), signaling a potential diversification of the Indian skies. However, a deeper investigation into these nascent carriers reveals a tapestry woven with financial ambiguities, historical missteps, and significant questions regarding promoter credentials, casting a long shadow over their ambitious flight plans.
The journey from an NOC to securing an Air Operator Certificate (AOC)—the actual license to fly—is arduous and capital-intensive, overseen by the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA), the country’s aviation regulator. The NOC is merely a preliminary clearance, valid for three years, during which an airline must demonstrate substantial progress in securing aircraft, establishing operational infrastructure, and, critically, proving robust financial solvency. India’s aviation history is replete with cautionary tales of airlines that received NOCs but never took off, or those that did, only to collapse under the weight of operational costs and fierce competition. The sector’s high fixed costs, volatile fuel prices (often constituting 30-40% of operating expenses), intense price wars, and the need for continuous capital infusion make it a graveyard for undercapitalized or poorly managed ventures. While new players promise increased connectivity and competitive fares for India’s burgeoning middle class, the current market structure and past failures underscore the imperative for rigorous scrutiny beyond initial approvals.
Among the trio, FlyExpress, operating under the corporate entity ABC Aviation and Training Services Ltd., raises the most immediate red flags. Incorporated in 2010 by Rajesh Ebrahimkutty and Anees Hassan Ali, the company’s 15-year history is marked by a striking absence of revenue, accumulated losses exceeding ₹39 crore by 2018, and a conspicuous lack of regular financial filings. This is not its first attempt at launching an airline; an earlier venture, "FLYeasy," also secured an NOC in the previous decade but never materialized. More troubling are the allegations of a pilot training scam, where ABC Aviation collected significant sums from aspiring pilots, promising trainee first officer roles, only to offer rudimentary classes before ceasing operations. Legal complaints across multiple states point to ₹2.88 crore due as "trainee first officer claims." Compounding these issues, a Delhi court convicted ABC Aviation, Ebrahimkutty, and another director in a ₹35 lakh cheque-bounce case in July last year, with more trainee-related cases pending. Furthermore, a former director resigned in 2017, citing "serious compliance and corporate governance issues," including the non-calling of board meetings and exorbitant salaries paid without proper resolutions. The company’s recent claim of a "complete change" in ownership and management by an undisclosed "large corporate group," without any public record of such a transaction, adds another layer of opacity, challenging the fundamental requirement for transparency in promoter credentials for an AOC.
Shankh Air, promoted by Sharvan Kumar Vishwakarma, presents a different, yet equally precarious, narrative of ambition. Vishwakarma, a Class 10 dropout who rose from driving a tempo to establishing Shankh Trading Pvt. Ltd., a rapidly growing firm in steel, cement, and sand trading, has declared an audacious plan for Shankh Air. His trading company, incorporated only in June 2022, reported revenues of ₹643.7 crore and profits of ₹28.4 crore by December 2025, according to a Crisil report. While impressive, transitioning from commodity trading to the highly specialized and capital-intensive aviation sector is a monumental leap. Vishwakarma’s plans include starting with three wet-leased Airbus A320s by March, expanding to 30 planes within two years, and committing ₹430 crore, reportedly from undisclosed overseas lenders. This aggressive timeline and reliance on unverified foreign capital raise serious questions. Aviation experts, like Captain Shakti Lumba, caution that even for initial operations, an airline needs at least ₹80-100 crore for activities like aircraft acquisition. Vishwakarma’s personal financial choices, such as securing a ₹5 crore loan for a Lamborghini in July last year, while not illegal, spark questions about financial prudence given the immense capital requirements and inherent risks of an airline startup. His unabashed passion for luxury cars, though a personal matter, stands in stark contrast to the stringent financial discipline required to navigate the razor-thin margins of the airline industry.
Alhind Air, backed by the more established Alhind Group—a diversified travel conglomerate with significant operations in ticketing, charter services, hotels, cargo, and logistics—appears to be on comparatively firmer ground. Its flagship, Alhind Tours and Travels Pvt. Ltd., reported robust revenues of ₹1,771.57 crore and a net profit of ₹12.49 crore in 2024-25. However, even this more credentialed entity faces substantial hurdles. Alhind Air’s paid-up capital stood at ₹10.10 crore as of March 2025, falling short of the DGCA’s prescribed minimum requirements for regional airlines. For operating up to five aircraft with a maximum takeoff weight (MTOW) of 40,000kg or less (which includes the ATR 72s Alhind plans to use), the minimum paid-up capital is ₹20 crore, with additional capital required for larger fleets. This shortfall, nearly ₹10 crore, highlights a significant regulatory compliance issue even before operations commence. Furthermore, the airline has faced execution challenges, including stalled financing discussions with major banks over collateral requirements and involvement in arbitration proceedings concerning advisory fees. Reports of employees being placed on unpaid leave further underscore the operational difficulties in securing crucial funding and moving towards an AOC. While the Alhind Group’s established presence in the travel sector offers a degree of institutional backing, the aviation arm’s current financial standing and operational snags demonstrate the industry’s unforgiving nature, even for well-connected groups.
India’s aviation landscape is often described as an airline graveyard, a stark reminder of the industry’s inherent volatility. Since deregulation in 1991, out of 45 private carriers approved, 29 have ceased operations and six have merged, leaving only a handful of players today. The failures of Kingfisher Airlines, Jet Airways, Air Deccan, and Sahara Airlines serve as cautionary tales, driven by a confluence of factors: aggressive expansion without sufficient capital, unsustainable pricing strategies, soaring fuel costs, global economic downturns, and, in some cases, allegations of financial mismanagement. These historical precedents emphasize that mere enthusiasm or a diversified business background is often insufficient to withstand the relentless pressures of this highly competitive sector. Each collapse has ripple effects, impacting employees, passengers, airport operators, and the broader financial ecosystem, often leading to a loss of public trust and investor confidence.
The collective circumstances surrounding FlyExpress, Shankh Air, and Alhind Air compel a critical re-evaluation of the regulatory framework for granting initial clearances. While Manoj Chacko, CEO of regional airline FLY91, asserts that the NOC process is "quite thorough," involving detailed checks on capital, business plans, and promoter antecedents, the revealed histories of these three entities suggest potential gaps in enforcement or the adequacy of current norms. Experts like Sanjay Lazar of Avialaz Consultants advocate for significantly higher capital requirements, proposing that promoters should demonstrate at least 18-24 months of working capital. The current rules, he argues, are "too low" and potentially allow "frivolous players" into a sector that demands immense financial resilience and impeccable corporate governance. Tightening these norms, especially regarding promoter integrity, proven financial reserves, and a clear, publicly verifiable funding roadmap, could serve as a crucial safeguard, ensuring that only genuinely viable and responsibly managed airlines are cleared for take-off, thereby protecting consumer interests and fostering sustainable growth in India’s strategically vital aviation sector.
In conclusion, while the government’s aspiration to inject more competition into India’s duopolistic airline market is commendable, the preliminary status of aspiring carriers like FlyExpress, Shankh Air, and Alhind Air raises substantial concerns. Their varied financial ambiguities, historical operational irregularities, and current challenges underscore the need for an exceptionally robust and stringent regulatory oversight. Encouraging new entrants is vital for expanding connectivity and enhancing consumer choice, but this must be meticulously balanced with ensuring the long-term stability and integrity of the aviation ecosystem. Without more rigorous vetting of financial muscle, promoter background, and transparent business plans, India risks adding more names to its list of failed airlines, further eroding trust and potentially destabilizing a sector critical to its economic growth and global connectivity. The path to the skies is challenging; only those with truly solid foundations should be allowed to embark on the journey.
