India’s ambitious regional air connectivity scheme, UDAN (Ude Desh ka Aam Nagrik), designed to democratize air travel and spur economic growth in underserved areas, has registered its slowest pace of new airport operationalizations since its inception nine years ago. With the current fiscal year drawing to a close, a mere four airports have been brought into active service under the scheme, a stark decline from its peak performance and significantly below previous years’ additions. This slowdown raises critical questions about the long-term sustainability and strategic direction of a program central to the government’s infrastructure and inclusive development agenda for the nation of over 1.4 billion people.
Launched in 2016, UDAN aimed to bridge the vast geographical disparities in air access by reviving dormant airstrips and establishing new airports in unserved regions, thereby making air travel both accessible and affordable for the common citizen. The scheme operates on a unique viability gap funding (VGF) model, subsidizing airlines to operate routes that would otherwise be commercially unviable, with fare caps on a portion of seats. This innovative approach initially spurred a rapid expansion, transforming the aviation landscape and connecting numerous smaller towns to major metropolitan hubs and state capitals.
However, the initial momentum has demonstrably waned. Official data presented to Parliament reveals a consistent deceleration in airport additions after an early surge. Following 16 airports (including heliports) connected in FY18 and a high of 18 in FY19, the numbers saw a dip to 14 in FY20. Even during the challenging pandemic years, FY21 and FY22 each saw nine airports operationalized. Post-pandemic, the pace moderated further, with eight additions in FY23 and ten in FY24, an election year. The decline intensified in FY25 with only six additions, culminating in the current fiscal year’s unprecedented low of four. This shortfall also misses earlier budget expectations, which had projected the upgrade of 13 aerodromes and the operationalization of 12 new airports for the period.
The recent additions this fiscal year include Amravati in Maharashtra, Purnea in Bihar, and Datia and Satna in Madhya Pradesh. However, even these limited successes are shadowed by immediate challenges. Datia has already ceased operations after regional carrier FlyBig suspended its services, underscoring the precariousness of connectivity on several UDAN routes. Satna, despite a virtual inauguration by the Prime Minister in May 2025 alongside Datia, subsequently failed to attract any bidders or operators and was ultimately removed from the official UDAN operational list submitted to Parliament in February. Such instances highlight the fragility inherent in the scheme’s execution, where an airport’s physical readiness does not automatically translate into sustained air service.
The Ministry of Civil Aviation, while acknowledging the reduced numbers, maintains that the current pace does not signal a loss of momentum but rather reflects a "changing nature of the remaining airport pipeline." In its official statement, the ministry elaborated that the easier-to-activate airstrips, requiring minimal upgrades, were addressed in the early phases. What remains now are predominantly projects in more challenging geographies, demanding extensive civil works, multi-agency clearances, intricate land availability resolutions, and stringent safety/operational validations. These complex requirements inherently extend the timeline from development to operationalization, pushing back the schedule for new connections.
Beyond infrastructure and bureaucratic hurdles, a critical bottleneck has emerged within India’s regional airline ecosystem. Aviation industry executives point to a fundamental imbalance where infrastructure development has outpaced the growth and stability of regional operators. India currently relies on a limited number of regional carriers, such as Fly91, Star Air, IndiaOne, and state-run Alliance Air. Many of these face their own challenges, from fleet maintenance issues and pilot shortages to the broader economic pressures of high operating costs. Several early UDAN participants have either significantly downsized or completely exited the market, leaving a vacuum in regional connectivity.
The operational fragility is further exacerbated by the dependency on single airlines for many smaller routes. When a carrier faces fleet disruptions, maintenance issues, or withdraws from a route, entire airports can swiftly become inactive. A prime example is Shimla airport, an early UDAN success story, which is currently non-operational. Flights on the Shimla-Delhi-Shimla sector, initially supported by VGF, were discontinued after the three-year financial support tenure ended in October 2025. Similarly, the Shimla-Amritsar service, which began in November 2023, was also suspended in October 2025 due to Alliance Air’s operational aircraft shortages. Such incidents reveal the scheme’s susceptibility to airline-specific challenges and the transient nature of VGF support.
The economic viability of these regional routes presents a significant hurdle. Many of the unserved or revived airstrips are suitable only for smaller turboprop aircraft or regional jets due to runway limitations and lower passenger demand. Airlines, grappling with capacity constraints, naturally prioritize deploying their fleets on high-density metro routes, where yields are substantially higher and operational efficiencies are greater. This commercial imperative often sidelines regional connectivity, even with subsidies. Mark D. Martin, CEO of Martin Consulting, encapsulates this dilemma, stating, "Demand depth is a genuine constraint. Reviving an airstrip does not automatically generate traffic." He emphasizes that the challenge has evolved beyond mere infrastructure development to ensuring a robust ecosystem of regional operators, suitable aircraft, and sustainable local demand.
The financial outlay by the government for UDAN has been substantial. Approximately ₹900 crore has been spent on developing airports that are now non-operational, representing a significant sunk cost. Furthermore, around ₹260 crore has been disbursed as financial support for airline operations on UDAN routes, contributing to an overall subsidy bill of nearly ₹4,500 crore since FY18. While these investments have yielded positive results in some areas, connecting 78 operational airports and over 650 routes, the high rate of attrition—15 out of 93 developed airports are non-operational, and 266 out of 923 awarded routes have been discontinued—raises serious questions about the return on investment and the efficacy of the VGF model in fostering long-term self-sufficiency.
In response to these sustainability concerns, the government is reportedly re-evaluating its approach. Minister of State for Aviation, Murlidhar Mohol, indicated that efforts are underway to enhance the scheme’s long-term viability by increasing the involvement of state governments. States are being urged to identify aerodromes with stronger, more sustainable traffic potential. Furthermore, airlines will now be required to submit comprehensive business plans before routes are awarded, aiming to ensure more timely and reliable operationalization. The Finance Minister, Nirmala Sitharaman, also flagged plans for a new UDAN program in the FY26 budget speech, with proposals currently awaiting financial clearances before Cabinet approval as part of the FY27 budget process.
For UDAN to truly achieve its transformative potential, a recalibrated strategy is imperative. This might involve a more dynamic and flexible VGF structure, potentially linked to actual passenger load factors and economic impact metrics rather than fixed tenures. Greater emphasis on developing diversified regional airline fleets, including encouraging the manufacturing or leasing of suitable turboprops and smaller jets, could alleviate the aircraft shortage. Furthermore, integrating regional air connectivity with broader regional economic development plans—identifying areas with genuine tourism, industrial, or business potential—would help cultivate the necessary demand depth. Learning from global models, such as the Essential Air Service program in the United States or regional support schemes in the European Union, could offer valuable insights into balancing public service with commercial realities. The continued success of UDAN is not just about connecting dots on a map; it’s about building a resilient, economically viable network that supports India’s aspirational growth story and truly makes air travel accessible to all.
